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NO. 19 MARCH 2021 Introduction 
The Conference on the Future of Europe 
Obstacles and Opportunities to a European Reform Initiative That Goes 
beyond Crisis Management 
Nicolai von Ondarza and Minna Ålander 
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union (EU) has been struggling to implement 
structural reforms. New steps towards integration have only been possible under 
intense pressure during crises, and treaty change has become taboo. The Conference 
on the Future of Europe is supposed to open a new path and generate new ideas for 
the development of the Union through a hybrid format of interinstitutional negotia-
tions and citizen participation. However, its launch has been delayed considerably – 
and not only by the Covid-19 pandemic; the aims, level of ambition, and structure of 
the Conference have also been the subject of controversy among the EU institutions. 
To create the momentum for lasting reform, the Conference must overcome four ob-
stacles: the scepticism of many member states, the taboo of treaty change, interinsti-
tutional rivalries, and past difficulties that the EU has had with citizen participation. 
 
“Not to be confused with ‘Convention on 
the Future of Europe’” warns the Wikipedia 
page on the Conference on the Future of 
Europe. In the namesake Convention in 
2002–2004, a draft for a “Treaty establish-
ing a Constitution for Europe” was devel-
oped. After a difficult period in which citi-
zens in France and the Netherlands rejected 
the “Constitutional Treaty” in public refer-
endums, there was a complete overhaul of 
the EU treaties in the form of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. This time, however, the EU Council 
is opposed to a similarly ambitious reform 
of the treaties. But what exactly the Con-
ference on the Future of Europe is supposed 
to achieve remains unclear. 
Before her being elected as the European 
Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen 
put the Conference on the agenda in 
her candidacy speech as an election 
pledge to the European Parliament (EP), 
primarily to reform the Spitzenkandidaten 
principle, which had failed in 2019. Sub-
sequently, the Conference fell victim to 
the Covid-19 pandemic. Its launch had 
originally been scheduled for May 2020, 
but it had to be postponed due to the lock-
downs. Since then, the launch has been 
further derailed by institutional squabbles 
between the three main EU institutions 
(Parliament, Council, and Commission), 
in particular about who should lead the 
exercise. Although the three institutions 
have now agreed on a joint approach and 
a start in May 2021, the disagreement is 
indicative of the four main obstacles to a 
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successful Conference on the Future of 
Europe. 
The Conference As a 
Reform Laboratory 
The first major challenge is to clarify the 
scope of the reforms to be discussed, in 
particular whether treaty change should 
be included. 
In principle, the Conference is intended 
to point out new ways to further the devel-
opment of the EU. A look at the European 
agenda reveals a pressing need to fix struc-
tural deficits. Reform processes, such as 
in asylum and migration policy or in the 
banking union, have been stuck for years, 
and central structural deficits in the Euro-
zone have still not been eliminated. At the 
same time, the EU is struggling to maintain 
its global role in a world that is increasingly 
dominated by competition between great 
powers as well as in its crisis-ridden neigh-
bourhood. The efforts to deal with the 
Covid-19 pandemic have raised new ques-
tions about competences in health policy. 
The 2019 European elections and their 
aftermath have also underlined the need to 
reform the selection process for EU leader-
ship positions and its democratic legitimacy. 
Overcoming the blockade of 
treaty change 
Despite this obvious need for reform, the 
EU and its member states have only been 
able to find solutions to the many internal 
and external challenges over the past decade 
with great difficulties. One reason for this 
is that treaty change has become taboo. 
Since 2009, the EU has not touched its trea-
ties during any of its structural crises – the 
Euro crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, and 
the contestation of the rule of law. 
A common argument against reforming 
EU primary law is that the EU treaties are 
based on a complex package of compromises 
between member states. Changes to the trea-
ties would require unravelling this package, 
akin to opening Pandora’s box. The ratifica-
tion process also harbours great political 
risks. In the end, not only all national gov-
ernments, but also national parliaments, 
constitutional courts, and in some cases the 
citizens, via referendums, must approve 
treaty amendments. Such amendments are 
therefore very time-consuming and not 
suitable for responding rapidly to crises. For 
instance, eight years passed from the Laeken 
Declaration (2001) to the Constitutional 
Treaty and, finally, the Lisbon Treaty (2009). 
Even the “simplified treaty amendment 
procedure” to secure the European Stability 
Mechanism in 2011–2013 by adding a 
single sentence to Article 136 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU took more 
than two years (see SWP Comment 50/2015). 
Hence, a majority of the member states 
will attempt to block treaty change from 
the Conference agenda. That would be a 
mistake on two counts. On the one hand, 
it would exclude reform proposals that 
require treaty changes – for example, in 
the institutional area. On the other hand, it 
would block the opportunity to link policy 
areas, which is precisely what the Confer-
ence would be well-suited to do with its 
broad, long-term approach. It would there-
fore be better to keep the outcome of the 
Conference open and to neither demand 
nor categorically rule out treaty changes. 
Reforms only during crises 
Both a feature and a symptom of the block-
ade of treaty change is that, in the last decade, 
changes could (almost) only be pushed 
through during crises. “Every crisis also 
offers an opportunity” has become a com-
mon saying in Brussels. The EU has indeed 
often adopted far-reaching integration 
measures in a very short time. But these 
steps were taken only under high pressure, 
and they only went as far as was necessary 
to contain the immediate crisis. Two exam-
ples illustrate this “integration in crisis 
mode”. 
The first example is the Eurozone. Here, 
the member states agreed to set up first a 
temporary – and later a permanent – 
Euro “rescue fund” with the European Sta-
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bility Mechanism to contain the sovereign 
debt crisis. With the Euro Plus Pact and the 
Fiscal Compact, groups of 19 and 25 mem-
ber states, respectively, reached two agree-
ments on budgetary measures. In 2014–
2015, the Eurozone also established the 
first components of a banking union. How-
ever, since the acute crisis pressure started 
to subside in the Eurozone from 2015 on-
wards, completion of the banking union 
has hardly progressed. 
A second example is the common asylum 
and migration policy. In 2015–2016, the EU 
significantly expanded the mandate of its 
border control agency, Frontex, in a rela-
tively short period of time and adopted the 
controversial refugee distribution scheme. 
However, since significantly fewer refugees 
are now arriving in the EU, a thorough re-
form of the asylum and migration system has 
stalled. 
What these examples have in common is 
that the reform processes have a) only come 
about as a result of severe pressure due to 
crises, b) been ad hoc in response to individ-
ual, particularly pronounced crisis indicators, 
and c) not addressed structural deficits. In 
contrast, progress in the reform processes 
not driven by crises has been slow. For 
example, in September 2016, the heads of 
state and government of the EU-27 launched 
the “Bratislava Roadmap” to underline the 
EU’s capacity to act and its added value 
in response to the Brexit vote. Although 
individual legislative projects such as the 
establishment of a Travel Information and 
Authorisation System were adopted, the 
fundamental problems of the EU’s asylum 
and migration system, which were the 
focus of attention, could not be resolved. 
Later, then-president of the European Coun-
cil, Donald Tusk, initiated the “Leaders’ 
Agenda” for 2017–2019. As part of it, the 
27 heads of state and government agreed 
to tackle reform blockades, inter alia on the 
banking union and the democratic legiti-
macy of the EU. However, in the absence 
of any pressure from a crisis, none of these 
dossiers registered substantial progress, 
even though they had been declared Chef-
sache (a matter for the bosses). 
An EU that is only capable of reform 
during crises cannot be stable in the long 
run. As a political construct with loose 
direct links to its citizens and a scarcely 
evolving European public sphere, the EU is 
particularly dependent on output legitimacy. 
Every existential crisis damages its accept-
ance among the population. Consequently, 
the Conference needs to demonstrate that 
the EU is capable of generating reform 
initiatives without acute crises pressure. 
The Conference As an 
Interinstitutional Body 
The second major challenge is balancing 
the interests of the EU institutions. The 
associated conflicts are already apparent in 
negotiations on the mandate and structure 
of the Conference and will shape it. 
In her candidacy speech in July 2019, 
Ursula von der Leyen promised the EP “new 
momentum for democracy in Europe”, a 
conference that would deal primarily with 
the reform of the so-called Spitzenkandidaten 
principle and a right of initiative for the EP. 
This electoral promise was intended to com-
pensate the EP and persuade Members of 
the European Parliament to accept the fact 
that, with von der Leyen’s election, the 
European Council had prevailed over the 
EP on the Spitzenkandidaten principle. 
Since then, however, the von der Leyen 
Commission’s political impetus for the Con-
ference has waned considerably. In a Janu-
ary 2020 communication, the Commission 
shifted the focus from institutional issues to 
a broader outreach along the Commission’s 
policy priorities and the European Council’s 
Strategic Agenda. Institutional reforms – 
including the Spitzenkandidaten principle 
and further steps to strengthen democracy 
in the EU – should no longer be in the 
focus. Finally, in her “State of the European 
Union” address in September 2020, von der 
Leyen only mentioned the Conference in 
the context of the development of an “EU 
Health Union”.  
In contrast, the EP embraced the idea of 
the Conference with great enthusiasm. In 
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two resolutions adopted in January and 
June 2020, the majority of MEPs spoke out 
in favour of ambitious goals that, in addi-
tion to broad-based citizen participation 
and an open agenda, focus on institutional 
reforms without excluding the option of 
treaty change. The Conference is thus seen 
as an opportunity, on the one hand, to 
strengthen input legitimacy through citizen 
participation and, on the other, to deepen 
integration, including an expansion of EU 
competences and greater powers for the EP. 
However, many national governments 
in the Council have reservations about the 
Conference. The Council was the last insti-
tution to define its position in June 2020. 
Evidently, the more sceptical member states 
prevailed, and the Council aimed, above all, 
to limit the scope of activities of the Confer-
ence. In accordance with Article 48 of the 
EU Treaty (TEU), treaty changes were set to 
be excluded from the start. In terms of con-
tent, the Council preferred the Conference 
to follow the Strategic Agenda of the Euro-
pean Council. Institutional reforms are not 
mentioned – thus binding the Conference 
to the topics already set on the EU’s agenda 
by the heads of state and government. 
The Conference must therefore strike 
a balance between these very different 
visions for the further development of the 
EU – between a partial deepening of inte-
gration in individual policy areas (as envis-
aged by the Commission), a programme 
to accompany the Strategic Agenda of the 
European Council (as proposed by the Coun-
cil), and a return to significantly deepening 
the level of integration (as advocated by 
the EP). 
The conference as a trilogue 
The institutional squabbles over the man-
date of the Conference, however, were as 
much about its structure as its overall 
aims. With regard to the composition of 
the Conference, the EP, the Council, and 
the Commission agree that not only national 
governments and the Commission but also 
the EP and national parliaments should be 
represented. Although the Council explicitly 
distinguishes the Conference from a con-
vention, its composition thus corresponds 
to the model of the latter, as provided by 
Article 48 (2) TEU. 
In addition to the pandemic, an inter-
institutional dispute over the leadership of 
the Conference has delayed its launch. At 
the Constitutional Convention, the Presid-
ium, under the leadership of former French 
President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, had a 
decisive influence on the final outcome. 
The EP therefore called for the Conference 
on the Future of Europe to be led by a co-
ordinating body made up of representatives 
of the three main EU institutions, but 
under the leadership of the EP. The Coun-
cil, on the other hand, called for an inde-
pendent “eminent European person”, i.e. 
a former head of state or government, to 
take the lead. 
As a compromise, the EU institutions 
have agreed that the Conference should be 
under the shared leadership of the Presi-
dents of the Parliament, the Council, and 
the Commission. They will be assisted by 
an Executive Board composed of three rep-
resentatives from each institution plus four 
observers – mainly so that each party 
group in the EP can have a seat at the table. 
Although this compromise defused the dis-
pute over the leadership issue in order to 
get the Conference started, it simultaneous-
ly created a very complex structure at its 
top. In effect, this imports the institutional 
struggles right into the leadership of the 
Conference. It also turns the Conference 
into an institutionalised trilogue, in which 
the three main EU institutions, accompa-
nied by national parliaments, wrestle over 
the future direction of the Union. 
Another controversial issue is how to 
deal with the outcome of the Conference. 
The EP wants all institutions to commit 
themselves to implementing the Confer-
ence’s recommendations as fully as pos-
sible. The Council, on the other hand, only 
wants to have a report drawn up for the 
European Council. In that case, the Confer-
ence would be in danger – similar to the 
EU citizens’ dialogues in 2018 – of failing 
to deliver any meaningful policy reforms. 
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The Scepticism of the 
Member States 
In the interinstitutional negotiations on the 
structure and mandate of the Conference, 
the Council was by far the most hesitant. 
This brings up the third challenge. Many 
national governments are sceptical about 
the added value and format of the Confer-
ence. From their point of view, the Con-
ference ties up resources needed for urgent 
challenges that should be dealt with through 
regular EU legislative processes and co-
ordination measures. The Council decision 
on the Conference was therefore signifi-
cantly less ambitious than the Commis-
sion’s communication and EP resolutions. 
In addition, the time component must 
be taken into consideration. Originally, the 
Conference was aimed to run two years: 
from May 2020 until the first half of 2022, 
with a view to the French presidency of the 
Council of the European Union. Implicitly, 
it was also intended as a sign of the Euro-
pean reform agenda for Emmanuel 
Macron’s election campaign in the French 
presidential elections in April/May 2022. 
Although the start of the Conference has 
been delayed by one year, the EU institu-
tions nevertheless decided to end it during 
the French Council presidency in 2022. This 
means that the Conference will be signifi-
cantly shorter and coincide almost entirely 
with election campaigns in Germany and 
France. These are conceivably difficult 
circumstances for the “Franco-German 
engine” to agree on far-reaching initiatives 
for the development of the EU. Due to the 
delayed start, it would make sense to 
extend the Conference, for example until 
the end of 2022 or mid-2023. 
Finally, the Conference cannot function 
without the active support of the national 
governments. The member states are still 
the “masters of the treaties” and conse-
quently decide what is possible within the 
EU framework. Any initiatives conceived 
within the Conference on the Future of 
Europe will therefore need the support of 
the member states and the EP, either as 
regular legal acts or in the form of treaty 
amendments. For the latter, the national 
parliaments will need to give their consent 
as well. 
The Conference As a 
Democracy Laboratory 
The fourth major challenge for the Confer-
ence is the involvement of citizens. Poten-
tially, the Conference offers the opportuni-
ty to introduce an element of participatory 
democracy into the political system of the 
EU. 
However, precisely how this participa-
tion is to be structured – as long as the 
pandemic and contact restrictions persist – 
remains a difficult question. The Commis-
sion has offered to establish a multilingual 
online portal through which EU citizens 
can discuss with each other and submit 
their suggestions to the EU institutions. It 
is up to the individual member states to 
organise additional local events. It must be 
ensured that the results are comparable 
through an overarching common concept 
and that the citizens’ ideas are included in 
the wider Conference debates. 
EU institutions also disagreed on how to 
involve citizens on the European level. The 
Parliament, in its January 2020 resolution, 
advocated for citizen and youth “agoras” 
with representatively selected individuals; 
the Council, in its June 2020 document, 
envisioned conferences in Brussels, Stras-
bourg, and member states; and the Com-
mission, in its January 2020 press release, 
spoke merely of participation “from all 
corners of the Union”. In March 2021, the 
three EU institutions agreed to organise 
“European Citizens’ Panels” as part of the 
Conference, which should be representative 
in terms of geographic origin, age, gender, 
and socio-economic background. For now, 
the agreement only states that the recom-
mendations from the citizens’ panels should 
provide input into the Conference’s plenary. 
Given the ongoing pandemic, it is clear that 
these citizens’ panels will initially have to 
take place in virtual form.  
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Previous experience with 
participatory democracy in the EU 
Even before the pandemic, the EU was 
struggling with participatory democracy. 
When it comes to comparable instruments 
of citizen participation, the EU institutions 
have so far hardly been willing to translate 
citizens’ recommendations into political 
initiatives. For example, the Treaty of Lis-
bon introduced the European Citizens’ 
Initiative (ECI), which enables Europeans to 
make proposals for legislative initiatives to 
the Commission. The ECI has been available 
since 2012. The previous Juncker Commis-
sion also organised citizen consultations, in 
which Europeans were able to submit their 
feedback on legislative initiatives to the 
Commission via internet surveys. Inspired 
by French President Emmanuel Macron’s 
Sorbonne speech in 2017, the member 
states also held national citizens’ dialogues 
in 2018. 
However, the results of these citizen par-
ticipation formats have hardly been incor-
porated into the EU’s decision-making pro-
cesses. Also, due to major logistical hurdles, 
only 6 out of 76 registered ECIs have reached 
the threshold of one million signatures. 
The Commission has evaluated five of them 
but did not fully implement the proposals 
of any of the successful ECIs. As a rule, it 
referred to existing EU legislation or on-
going legislative processes. In two cases, the 
Commission remained completely inactive. 
A citizens’ initiative against the Transatlan-
tic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
which collected more than three million 
signatures, was rejected by the Commission 
on grounds of a lack of competence – 
wrongly, as the European Court of Justice 
ruled in 2017. The Commission’s citizen 
consultations on the abolition of daylight 
saving time, which attracted a great deal of 
attention in Germany, have also been in-
conclusive to date. The citizens’ dialogues 
merely resulted in a report for the Council 
of the EU. 
When implemented in this way, citizen 
participation weakens rather than strength-
ens the democratic legitimacy of the EU. It 
creates an illusion of participation oppor-
tunities but ends up having no impact. 
If the Conference is to generate positive 
impulses for democratic legitimacy from 
citizen participation, it should make sure 
that the following conditions are fulfilled. 
First, the citizens involved should be selected 
using representative standards to account 
for differences in age, gender, geographic 
location, socio-economic standards, and 
political affiliation. Ireland, for example, 
has practiced this successfully in its citizen 
consultations. Second, because the Euro-
pean dimension and the pandemic make 
logistics considerably difficult, the EU 
should provide every conceivable logistical 
support for participation, from online plat-
forms to the necessary translation services 
to covering the costs of physical consulta-
tions. Last but not least, citizen participa-
tion needs, above all, to be given assurances 
that its results will be incorporated into the 
deliberation processes between the EU insti-
tutions. 
Prospects for the Conference 
The conception of the Conference as a 
hybrid of interinstitutional negotiations 
and citizen consultations was hardly 
feasible in the face of national lockdowns 
and European travel restrictions imposed in 
the wake of the Covid-19 outbreak. But the 
shortcomings of the Conference format go 
deeper than mere incompatibility with a 
global pandemic. Even when transnational 
physical meetings are possible again, the 
questions of how to overcome the institu-
tional turf wars and how to reform the EU 
in the absence of urgency generated by a 
crisis will remain on the table. In view of 
the difficult negotiations on the format of 
the Conference, two very different develop-
ment paths are conceivable. 
Scenario 1: 
A counterproductive show 
The first possible development is that the 
interinstitutional differences are not effec-
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tively addressed, and a lack of will to con-
duct thorough reforms on the part of 
national governments persists. As a result, 
the Conference is dutifully launched in 2021, 
but with an ambivalent mandate and on 
the basis of minimal compromise, accom-
panied by the continued scepticism of 
national governments concerning the fea-
sibility of far-reaching EU reforms. During 
the course of 2021/22, citizens are involved 
in the debates digitally and, if possible, via 
physical meetings throughout Europe at 
some later point. More ambitious reform 
proposals, however, are dismissed either 
with reference to ongoing legislative pro-
cesses in the EU, or because treaty changes 
would be necessary, which the member 
states reject. At the end of the process, the 
Conference leadership solemnly presents its 
results to the European Council – a report 
that invokes the European spirit but con-
tains few concrete recommendations. The 
European Council duly takes note of the 
report and makes a non-binding promise 
to implement the citizens’ demands within 
the framework of its Strategic Agenda. 
For the European Union, this would not 
only be another missed opportunity for 
reform. Organising a “Conference on the 
Future of Europe” with much fanfare, 
promising an elaborate mechanism for 
citizens’ involvement, and then not taking 
their proposals seriously would ultimately 
only demonstrate how great the distance 
is between the EU citizens and Brussels. 
This would do more harm than good to the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU. Instead of 
strengthening the EU internally before the 
next crises – which are certain to arise – 
the Union would continue to be capable of 
reforms only when crisis situations come 
to a head and pose an existential danger. 
In the long run, such crisis-driven reactions 
rightly reinforce doubts about the EU’s 
capacity to act. 
Scenario 2: A European impulse 
In the counter-scenario, the Conference on 
the Future of Europe can be used as a cata-
lyst for genuine European reform. In the 
course of the Conference, the participating 
national and European institutions succeed 
in drawing up a roadmap for structural 
reforms through the active participation of 
citizens. The reform proposals are presented 
to the EU institutions after extending the 
Conference to the end of 2022. After the 
German parliamentary elections in 2021 
and the French presidential and parliamen-
tary elections in 2022, there is a window of 
opportunity before the European elections 
in 2024 to push through substantial parts 
of these proposals, primarily with second-
ary law reforms, but also treaty change if 
necessary. As a result, the European elec-
tions in 2024 can take place on a new, 
strengthened institutional basis. 
Making this ideal-typical vision of the 
Conference a reality, however, will require 
considerable effort as well as courage, also 
from Germany, which should let go of the 
approach of gradual development of the 
EU only in times of crisis. Germany already 
took a major step into the unknown during 
the budget negotiations in the summer of 
2020 by abandoning its traditional opposi-
tion to the EU’s own debt in the face of the 
forecasted severe economic consequences of 
the Covid-19 pandemic. More such steps are 
necessary to make the EU fit for the future. 
To succeed, three conditions must be met. 
First, the Conference should have an open 
mandate with no taboos. Treaty change can-
not be a goal in itself, but neither should 
this option be categorically excluded. In the 
interest of credible citizen participation, the 
Conference should ensure from the outset 
that although citizens’ proposals are not 
intended to determine the outcome of the 
Conference, they are nevertheless incorpo-
rated into the deliberations in a concrete 
and comprehensible manner. The year 2020 
has already shown how quickly the focus 
can shift politically – from an emphasis on 
institutional issues and the Spitzenkandidaten 
principle in the aftermath of the European 
elections in 2019 to the need to reflect on 
the competences of the EU in health policy 
in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. The 
decisions already taken on the Next Gen-
eration EU (NGEU) fund – including the 
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expansion of the EU’s ability to issue debt 
and the prospect of new own resources for 
the Union – also offer points of departure 
for additional reforms. These historic steps 
towards deeper integration would benefit 
from a close link to the Conference. Last 
but not least, institutional adjustments in 
foreign and security policy are also pressing 
and may require treaty change. 
Second, a successful Conference depends 
on the political impetus from – and par-
ticipation of – the national capitals. In the 
end, EU reforms will only be implemented 
if they receive the necessary support of 
national governments in the (European) 
Council. Treaty changes or more far-reach-
ing reforms, such as the recent decision 
to renew the Own Resources Decision for 
the NGEU fund, additionally require the 
approval of the national parliaments. 
Germany and France have a particular 
responsibility in this respect. In the course 
of the pandemic, the EU succeeded in initi-
ating extensive changes in the EU budget 
with NGEU. The prerequisite for this was 
not only a classic Franco-German compro-
mise, in which both sides overcame signifi-
cant differences and made concessions 
to reach a joint understanding that most 
member states could support. It was also 
followed by a joint effort to involve various 
other groups in the EU – in particular the 
Frugal Four and the Visegrád states – which 
was sometimes a politically arduous process. 
If the Conference is to be successful, a 
comparable European policy initiative from 
Berlin and Paris is just as necessary as the 
involvement of other groups of member 
states. From the autumn of 2021, the new 
German government in particular will be 
called upon to launch initiatives for the 
further development of the EU – in and 
outside the Conference – together with 
other (groups of) member states. 
Third, the leadership of the Conference 
must succeed in combining the impulses 
from citizen participation, the European 
and national parliaments, and the national 
governments into a coherent package. The 
warning against opening Pandora’s box is 
justified when it comes to treaty changes. 
At the same time, a Conference in which 
package solutions can be combined with 
institutional reforms across all policy areas 
offers the chance to spark new momentum 
in the EU’s reform processes, which have 
been blocked for years. If the EU reform 
deadlock is to be broken, the Conference 
on the Future of Europe needs an open 
mandate, the political support of the mem-
ber states, and a leadership capable of tying 
the various political strands together into a 
workable compromise for reform. 
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